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RECENT CASES 
EVIDENCE - SIXTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT TARASOFF 
DISCLOSURES DO NOT VITIATE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT 
PRIVILEGE. - United States v. Hayes, 2 2 7  F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000). 
In 1996, the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a federal 
psychotherapist-patient privilege in J&ee v. Redmond.1 The Court 
did not explain, however, how this evidentiary privilege should coexist 
with a psychotherapist's so-called Tarasoff duty to breach confidential- 
ity when necessary to protect third parties against whom a patient has 
articulated serious threats.2 Jaffee included a footnote indicating that 
the privilege was not intended to invalidate this duty,3 but left unclear 
whether the privilege continues once disclosure of the patient's threats 
has breached ~onfidentiality.~ Indeed, the two circuits that have con- 
sidered this issue since Jaffee have adopted divergent approaches. The 
Tenth Circuit indicated in United States v. Glms5 that once a psycho- 
therapist has appropriately disclosed a patient's threats, those state- 
ments are no longer protected by privilege in a subsequent prosecution 
1 518 U.S. I, 15 (1996) ("[Wle hold that confidential communications between a licensed psy- 
chotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled 
disclosure under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence."). The Court included licensed psy- 
chiatrists, psychologists, and social workers engaging in psychotherapy in its definition of "li- 
censed psychotherapist." Id. The Court also explained that a patient may waive this privilege. 
Id. at  15 n.14. 
2 The Supreme Court of California first recognized this duty, commonly called the "dangerous 
patientn exception to confidentiality, in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Califmnia, 529 I?zd 
553 (Cal. 1974) (Tarasoff I). There, the court held that a psychotherapist treating a mentally ill 
patient has "a duty to use reasonable care to give threatened persons such warnings as are essen- 
tial to avert foreseeable danger arising from his patient's condition or treatment." Id. a t  559. In 
1976, the Supreme Court of California reheard the case. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (Tarasoff II). In Tarasoff 11, the court modified the nature of the 
"duty to warnn described in Tarasoff I and adopted a broader "duty to protect." Id. at  345. A ma- 
jority of states now recognize some form of this duty, in either statutory or case law. George C. 
Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception to the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: the Tarasoff 
Duty and the Jaffee Footnote, 74 WASH. L. REV. 33,47-48 (1999), 
3 JMee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19 ("[Wle do not doubt that there are situations in which the privi- 
lege must give way, for example, if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be 
averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist."). This footnote constituted the Court's 
sole mention of the issue. 
4 With the exception of California and Oregon, most states have similarly left this question 
unanswered. Harris, supra note 2, at 34-35. The California Evidence Code specifically states 
that the state's psychotherapist-patient privilege ceases once disclosure of a patient's statements is 
warranted. CAL. E m .  CODE $1024 (West 1995). The Oregon Supreme Court, by contrast, has 
held that Tarasoff disclosures do not vitiate Oregon's psychotherapist-patient privilege. State v. 
Miller, 709 Pzd 225, 236-37 (Or. 1985). 
5 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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of the patient.6 The Sixth Circuit, however, rejected that approach 
last year in United States v. Hayes.' Faced with the unusual prosecu- 
tion of a patient solely for uttering - without carrying out - threat- 
ening remarks to his psychotherapist about a federal employee, the 
Hayes majority held that the Jqfee privilege prevented the psycho- 
therapist from testifying to those threats in court, despite their previ- 
ous disclosure. Yet as the dissent remarked, the majority's overly 
broad language implied that a psychotherapist should never be permit- 
ted to testify about a patient's threats, even when those threats have 
already been disclosed and are offered as evidence of the patient's guilt 
of a subsequently committed crime.8 This blanket approach is incon- 
sistent with the rationale underlying the Jaffee privilege, and future 
courts should narrow the privilege to include only cases in which the 
crime is the threat itself. 
In 1997, postal worker Roy Lee Hayes, suffering from a severe de- 
pression accompanied by psychotic symptoms, began to behave errat- 
ically at work.9 He sought professional help and repeatedly informed 
his psychotherapists of his desire to kill his supervisor, postmaster Vera 
Odle.10 None of these psychotherapists, however, warned Odle of his 
threats." As Hayes's condition worsened, he ended up in the care of 
social worker James Van Dyke, to whom he confided his detailed plans 
to kill Odle.12 Van Dyke allegedly informed Hayes that he could not 
keep such statements confidential, and subsequently warned Odle of 
Hayes's threats.13 Odle consulted Postal Inspector Terrance Vlug, who 
obtained from Van Dyke Hayes's medical records, including those con- 
taining the threats.14 Vlug filed a criminal complaint against Hayes, 
charging him with threatening to murder a federal official.15 
6 Id. at 1359-60. The G k s  court stated that the crucial issue is whether the disclosure was 
necessary to avert a serious threat of harm to a third party. If so, the court indicated, the Jqfee 
privilege no longer protects the communication. See id. at 1360 ("[Oln remand, the district court 
must proceed under Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) to determine whether, in the context of this case, the 
threat was serious when it was uttered and whether its disclosure was the only means of averting 
harm to the [intended victim] when the disclosure was made."). 
7 2 2 7  E3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000). 
Id. at 588 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
Hayes, 2 2 7  E3d at 580. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id 
'3 Id. Under Tennessee law, if a patient has made an actual, credible threat to harm a person, 
a psychotherapist may disclose the patient's communications to the extent necessary to warn or 
protect the potential victim. TENN. CODE ANN. 8 Z ~ - I - Z O ~ ( C ) ( I )  (2000). 
l4 Hayes, 2 2 7  F.gd at 580-81. 
l5 Id. at 581. The United States Code makes it illegal to 
threaten[] to assault, kidnap, or murder, a United States official, a United States judge, a 
Federal law enforcement officer, or an official whose killing would be a crime under 
such section, with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such official . . . while 
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A grand jury indicted Hayes, who filed a motion to dismiss the in- 
dictment and to suppress his medical records as well as any testimony 
from psychotherapists whom he had seen.16 The magistrate judge rec- 
ommended suppression of the statements made to psychotherapists 
other than Van Dyke, but admission of Hayes's statements to Van 
Dyke.17 The district court, however, applied the Glass standardla and 
found that Hayes's statements to Van Dyke should also be privileged, 
as Van Dyke's disclosure to Odle had not necessarily been the only 
means of protecting her.lg Because the information from Van Dyke 
and the other psychotherapists had formed the basis of the indictment, 
the district court dismissed the case.20 
A three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed, but on different 
- and far more privilege-friendly - grounds. Writing for the major- 
ity, Judge Ryanz1 rejected the Glass approach and argued that the 
privilege issue should be considered in isolation from the confidential- 
ity exception.22 Even when a patient's threatening statements create a 
Tarasoff duty to disclose, he stated, the psychotherapist-patient privi- 
lege still prevents a psychotherapist from testifying to those threats at  
any criminal prosecut i~n.~~ He asserted that the Jaffee footnote meant 
only that the privilege must give way when psychotherapists need to 
testify in protective court proceedings (such as involuntary commit- 
ment hearings) to fulfill their duty to protect third parties, not that the 
privilege would cease altogether once disclosure had occurred.24 
Judge Ryan's argument for recognizing a distinction between psy- 
chotherapist-patient confidentiality and privilege rested mainly on 
policy considerations. He argued that the Tarasoff confidentiality ex- 
ception serves the immediate function of preventing serious harm to 
engaged in the performance of official duties, or with intent to retaliate against such of- 
ficial . . . on account of the performance of official duties . . . . 
18 U.S.C. 5 115(ax1) (1994). 
'6 Hayes, 227 E3d a t  581. 
17 Id. 
'8 See supra note 6. 
19 Hayes, 227 E3d at 581. This ruling meant that no one - including Odle - could testify in 
court to Hayes's threatening statements to Van Dyke, even though they had previously been dis- 
closed. 
20 Id. 
21 Distiict Judge Duggan joined Judge Ryan's opinion. 
22  Hayes, 227 E3d at 583-84. 
23 Id. a t  586 ("[Clompliance with the professional duty to protect does not imply a duty to tes- 
tify against a patient in criminal proceedings[,] . . . and such testimony is privileged and inadmis- 
sible if a patient properly asserts the psychotherapistlpatient privilege."). 
24 Id. at 585. Judge Ryan acknowledged that this interpretation reflected a shift from the 
Sixth Circuit's pre-Jqfee approach to this question, as expressed in United States v. Snelenberger, 
24 E3d 799, 802 (6th Cir. 1994). He thus held that Sneknberger could no longer be considered 
"good lawn on the issue. Hayes, 2 2 7  F.jd at  586. 
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third parties.25 Although the existence of this exception may affect a 
patient's candor in therapy sessions, this effect is likely to be "mar- 
ginal" and is outweighed by the need to protect third parties.26 By 
contrast, a privilege exception and a psychotherapist's concomitant 
warnings to his patient that his statements could result in criminal li- 
ability "would certainly chill and very likely terminate open dia- 
l o g ~ e . " ~ ~  Given the significant public interest in effective psychother- 
apy, Judge Ryan argued, the costs of allowing a psychotherapist to 
testify at a patient's prosecution would outweigh its .benefits.2s 
Judge Boggs dis~ented.~9 First, he questioned whether the Jaffee 
privilege even covered Hayes's communications with Van Dyke, be- 
cause Van Dyke was not yet a licensed counselor.30 He .also argued 
that Hayes had waived the privilege by continuing to threaten Odle 
after Van Dyke had warned him that such threats would not be kept 
~onfident ial .~~ Moreover, he expressed his concern that the "court's 
rule would apparently be the same even if the victim of the threat 
ended up dead, in a fashion exactly paralleling the material revealed to 
the mental health profes~ional."~~ Judge Boggs suggested an alterna- 
tive rule: privilege would preclude .admission of "anything said up to 
the point at which notice is given that the actual or threatened crimi- 
nal conduct being discussed is no longer covered by ~onfidentiality."~~ 
The Hayes majority correctly noted that the Jaffee footnote did not 
establish a "precedentially binding 'dangerous patient' exception" to 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege; it was too ambiguous to do so. 
Indeed, Jaffee made clear its expectation that future cases would de- 
lineate the full contours of the privilege.34 Nonetheless, Jaffee did sug- 
gest an analytical approach for this delineation. The Jaffee Court ex- 
plained that it had recognized a general privilege because the policy 
interests supported by the privilege - namely, the enhancement of ef- 
25 Hayes, 227 F.3d at 583. 
26 Id. at 584-85. 
27 Id. at 585. Judge Ryan also noted that most states recognize no such exception. Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 587 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
30 Id. at 588 n.1. In response, the majority argued that there was no evidence that Hayes was 
aware that Van Dyke was not licensed, and that it would "be grossly unfair to strip Hayes of the 
protections of a federal evidentiary privilege simply because his counselor was not what he held 
himself out to be." Hayes, 227 E3d at 587. 
3' Id. at 588 (Boggs, J., dissenting). The majority disagreed, arguing that "in order to secure a 
valid waiver of the protections of the psychotherapistlpatient privilege from a patient, a psycho- 
therapist must provide that patient with an explanation of the consequences of that waiver suited 
to the unique needs of that patient," and that no such explanation had been provided to Hayes. 
Hayes, 227 F.3d at 58f 
32 Id. at 588 (Boggs, J., dissenting). The majority did not respond to this specific concern. 
33 Id. at 589. 
34 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. I ,  18 (1996). 
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fective psychotherapy, which is premised on open communication - 
outweighed the evidentiary benefit from denying the privilege.35 Yet 
the Court also stated that in some situations the privilege would need 
to "give way" - particularly in cases implicating the duty to protect.36 
Given the Court's affirmation of the psychotherapist-patient privi- 
lege in Jqfee, the Hayes majority was correct to revisit the Sixth Cir- 
cuit's approach to the privilege with regard to the Tarasoff duty to pro- 
t e ~ t . ~ '  The majority should have recognized, however, the atypical 
nature of the case at hand. Because the target of Hayes's threats was 
a federal employee, the government could prosecute Hayes for merely 
uttering threatening statements about her to his therapist. But in the 
far greater number of cases, the intended victim is unlikely to be 
someone about whom it is illegal to utter threats. In these situations, 
even after the psychotherapist warns the potential victim, no criminal 
prosecution can commence - and no privilege question can arise - 
until the patient has harmed or attempted to harm the third party. 
As Judge Boggs indicated in his dissent, the majority's broad lan- 
guage failed to distinguish between these two categories of cases.38 
But the two prosecutorial contexts are qualitatively different, and de- 
termining whether a "dangerous patient" exception to the Jqfee privi- 
lege should apply to each requires two separate analyses under the 
Jaffee balancing test. In both contexts, of course, the Tarasoff "danger- 
ous patient" exception to confidentiality already applies. The issue is 
thus whether, in each category, an analogous "dangerous patient" ex- 
ception to privilege would inflict significant damage on the psycho- 
therapeutic relationship beyond that already caused by the confidenti- 
ality exception. In fact, the effect of such an exception to the privilege 
is likely to differ greatly from one category to the other. 
When the object of a patient's anger is a federal employee or offi- 
cial, the effect of implementing a "dangerous patient" exception to the 
privilege is severe because the threatening remarks are criminal in 
themselves. Without the exception, the gravest risk that a patient 
faces in revealing a desire to harm a federal official is the possibility of 
a Tarasofl breach of confidentiality to protect the official. Although 
daunting, this possibility does not necessarily deter a significant num- 
ber of patients from continuing with therapy.39 But when the privilege 
35 Id. at I 1-12. 
36 Id. at I 7-18. 
37 AS noted above, the Sixth Circuit had previously ruled that disclosure did vitiate the psy- 
chotherapist-patient privilege. See supra note 24. 
38 Hayes, a27 F.gd at 588 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
39 See, e.g., Toni Pryor W i ,  Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychothera- 
pists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165, 177 (1978). Wise notes that in a 
study of 1272 psychotherapists, conducted one year after Tamsoff II, only one-fourth 'reported 
observing in their patients some reluctance to discuss their violent tendencies when the patients 
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exception is combined with the confidentiality exception, the risk a pa- 
tient faces in revealing a desire to harm a federal official increases 
dramatically: he faces incarceration for the mere fact of having made 
that statement to his psychotherapist. 
Here, the need to protect effective psychotherapy outweighs the 
evidentiary need for such information. Although the evidentiary need 
for the information is significant - the psychotherapist's testimony is 
the only incriminating evidence - vitiating the privilege in this con- 
text would greatly undermine a psychotherapist's ability to treat a pa- 
tient who has violent feelings toward a federal official. The Hayes 
majority thus correctly held that the privilege should apply in this rare 
context.40 The effectiveness of psychotherapy should not vary ac- 
cording to the identity of the threatened third party. 
But in the more likely scenario in which uttering a threat is not an 
offense in and of itself, a "dangerous patient" exception to the privilege 
would have a less significant impact on psychotherapy's effectiveness. 
Even without this exception, a psychotherapist must warn his patient 
that credible statements regarding an intent to harm a third party 
cannot be kept confidential. An analogous "dangerous patient" excep- 
tion to the privilege would only require a psychotherapist to add that 
if, despite the psychotherapist's protective measures, the patient does 
harm the third party, the psychotherapist could be compelled to testify 
against the patient. The critical question is thus whether a significant 
number of patients who disclose their violent impulses to their psycho- 
therapists even after learning of the Tarasoff exception would become 
unwilling to do so when advised that if they actually acted on those 
impulses, their psychotherapists might have to testify against them. 
The Hayes majority offered no rationale for its belief that there 
would be many such patients,4l and, in fact, psychological literature 
learned that the therapist might in some circumstances breach confidentiality." Id. at 177. Simi- 
larly, only one-fourth of the psychotherapists had ever lost a patient because of the patient's fear 
that the psychotherapist would breach confidentiality. Id. at 177 n.67; see also Fillmore Buckner 
& Marvin Firestone, "Where the Public Peril Begins": 25 Years After Ibasoff, a I J. LEGAL MED. 
187, 221 (1000) ("Based upon the case law and surveys over the past 25 years, even if confidenti- 
ality must be breached, the earlier anticipated negative effects have not materialized. There is 
just no evidence thus far that patients have been discouraged from coming to therapy, or diicour- 
aged from speaking freely once there, for fear that their confidentiality will be breached.") But 
see Daniel 0. Taube & Amiram Elwork, Researching the Effects of Confidentiality Lcrw on Pa- 
tients' Self-Disclosures, 2 1  PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 7 2 ,  74 (1990) (concluding that "the 
extent to which patients are informed about the law and the extent to which the law is consequen- 
tial for them are two of the factors that determine whether limitations to privacy will affect pa- 
tients' self-disclosures"). 
40 Compare this rule to the one proposed by the dissent. Under Judge Boggs's proposal, the 
privilege would be vitiated even in cases in which the threat itself was the crime, as long as the 
patient uttered the threat after receiving notice from the psychotherapist. 
41 The Hayes majority simply stated in conclusory fashion that an exception "would certainly 
chill and very likely terminate open dialogue," without distinguishing between the two different 
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suggests that few patients would react in this way. Those patients who 
remain in therapy even after being advised of the limits on confidenti- 
ality typically do so because they recognize their need for help and be- 
lieve that psychotherapy may provide it.42 If handled appropriately, 
the psychotherapist's discussion with his patient about his duty to pro- 
tect third parties can even improve both the therapeutic relationship 
and the patient's progress.43 In short, a patient's primary concern in 
these cases is often to overcome his desire to harm a third party rather 
than fear that he will be convicted if he does commit the harm.44 
Thus, adding a privilege exception to the confidentiality exception 
in this prosecutorial context would not have nearly the detrimental 
impact on psychotherapy's effectiveness that such an addition would 
have when making the threat is itself a crime. The evidentiary benefit 
from such an exception to the privilege, however, might well be con- 
siderable. In the event that a patient actually carried out or attempted 
to carry out threats that his psychotherapist had already disclosed, the 
psychotherapist's testimony could be critically important in establish- 
ing such elements as identity, motive, and absence of mistake. Jaffee's 
balancing test thus favors an exception to the privilege with regard to 
previously disclosed threats that the patient subsequently carries out. 
Although the Hayes court appropriately used the Jafee rationale to re- 
consider its approach to the specific factual scenario at issue, it should 
not have been so quick to declare that the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege prevents a psychotherapist from testifying to his patient's 
threatening statements in all subsequent criminal prosecutions. 
prosecutorial contexts in which a patient's statements might be used against him. Hayes, 227 
F.jd at  585. 
42 See Robert D. Miller, Gary J. Maier & Michael Kaye, Miranda Comes to the Hospital: The 
Right to Remain Siknt in  Civil Commitment, 142 AM. J .  PSYCHIATRY 1074, 1076 (1985) (de- 
scribing the results of a study in which a psychotherapist informed patients that anything they 
said during therapy sessions could be used against them in an involuntary civil commitment 
hearing and noting that the majority of the patients still engaged in open disclosure with the 
therapist, largely because of their perceived need for help and their belief that talking to the staff 
was necessary to obtain it). 
43 See James C .  Beck, A Clinical Survey of the Tarasoff Experience, in THE POTENTIALLY 
VIOLENT PATIENT AND THE TARASOFF DECISION IN PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE 60 aames C. 
Beck ed., 1985). Beck describes eighteen cases in which a patient's threatening statements toward 
a third party prompted his psychotherapist to consider warning that third party. Beck concludes: 
Cases in which the clinician discusses the warning with the patient before giving it typi- 
cally show no bad effects resulting from the warning. In some of these cases, especially 
when the therapist clearly sees the potential violence as a therapeutic issue (and corre- 
spondingly sees the duty to warn as having clinical relevance), the discussion of the 
warning appears to have a positive impact on the psychotherapeutic process, and on the 
development of the [patient-therapist] alliance. 
Id. at 80. 
44 See, e.g., id. at  63-64 (describing one patient who stated 'with considerable intensityn that 
she was afraid she might strangle her infant grandson). 
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